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Abstract
Jamming attacks, which are the main cause of data corruption and network blockages in wireless sensor
networks (WSNs), are one of the most serious threats for WSNs. This type of attack not only blocks the
ongoing communication in the network, but also causes the wireless nodes to exhaust their energy much
earlier than expected. A countermeasure must be deployed against jamming attacks, especially in military
and medical applications in which security breaches cannot be tolerated. In this paper, we have designed a new
query-based jamming detection algorithm (QUJDA) to detect jamming attacks occurring in WSNs. QUJDA is
an attack detection mechanism, which uses an anomaly-based approach and operates in a distributed manner.
It separates attacking cases from natural network conditions by the help of packet delivery ratio, bad packet
ratio, and the amount of energy consumption parameters. QUJDA enables sensor nodes to operate with
their neighbors in a collective sense in order to achieve higher detection rates. QUJDA was evaluated and
analyzed over 3 parameters: detection rates, false-positive rates, and communication overheads. According
to the simulation results obtained, all critical jamming attacks can be detected with 97% or above detection
rates, along with 0.95% or lower false positive rates. In addition, QUJDA only charges about 13% extra
communication overhead to the network message traﬃc of the sensor nodes.
Key Words: Wireless sensor network, jamming attacks, denial of service, intrusion detection

1.

Introduction

WSNs consist of several autonomous wireless sensor nodes that incorporate a series of small, integrated,
application-speciﬁc sensors, a communication radio, and a battery. The size of these ad hoc-based networks
primarily depends on the requirements of the application. The task of each node generally incorporates
monitoring varied physical, chemical, or biological parameters in the target environment. The data obtained
from sensor nodes is forwarded to the nearest neighbor nodes in an ad hoc manner. The nodes, scattered
∗ A preliminary version of this paper appeared in ACM Infoscale 2008, June 10-12, Italy [17]. This paper includes an updated
version of jamming detection algorithm, detailed description of detection algorithm, and further performance analysis.
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randomly in the target ﬁelds or buildings, use a common communication protocol and follow a predetermined
scenario [1].
The sensor nodes usually operate outside and mostly in severe environments such as storms, blizzards,
heavy rains, and so forth. Therefore, a risk of physical or functional damage cannot be avoided in many cases.
Worse still, the sensor nodes can be reprogrammed by adversary people so that seized sensor nodes can cause
several network failures [2]. This type of security hazard facilitates the development of various styles of attack
in WSNs, such as the jamming-style denial of service (J-DoS) attacks, in which attacker nodes (jammers) inject
strong artiﬁcial radio signals into the network to block the existing communication between the sensor nodes
[3-5].
In earlier studies, several research topics were examined for the J-DoS attacks in the MAC and physical
layers. While Wood et al. deﬁned collision, exhaustion, and unfairness attacks [3], Xu et al. derived constant,
deceptive, reactive, and random jammers inspired by those 3 jammers [4]. Reactive jammers resemble collision
jammers, deceptive jammers resemble exhaustion jammers, and constant jammers resemble unfairness jammers.
Each jammer has its own individual jamming technique; for example, the constant jammer sends out
random bits to the medium without following any MAC-layer etiquette. The communication among the nodes
is suspended by these activities. Instead of sending out random bits constantly, the deceptive jammer transmits
the legitimate packets to the medium at high rates. In this manner, nodes remain in receiving mode constantly,
and thus, the communication medium is kept unavailable all the time. On the other hand, the random jammer
attacks the network at random time slots, and sleeps in the other periods to preserve its energy. As for the
reactive jammer, it listens to the network constantly and initiates an attack when a preamble of a packet is
detected. In other words, it attacks only when the network is busy.
Law et al. proposed a couple of energy eﬃcient jammers for various MAC protocols [6, 7]. They showed
that many attacking scenarios could be implemented by utilizing the constant timing structure of the S-MAC
protocol. Since no encryption technique is used in the data link layer, the contents of the data packets can be
revealed without any diﬃculty. Thus, the listen/sleep timings of the nodes can be estimated with the help of
SYNC packets. Using this mechanism, 3 energy eﬃcient jammer models have been developed by Law et al.: a
periodic listen interval jammer (LIJ), periodic control interval jammer (CIJ), and data packet jammer (DaJ).
Another jammer type that has been developed by Law et al. uses a prediction mechanism on encrypted packets
of the message. This jammer, called a periodic cluster jammer (PCJ), corrupts the data packets in the S-MAC
frames [7].
In other research conducted by Wood et al., 4 new energy-eﬃcient jammers were proposed [8]. The
interrupt jammer (IJ) listens to the network to detect any packet traﬃc in the medium. Instead of constant
listening, the IJ uses a peripheral hardware unit, which initiates an interrupt signal when a preamble and a
start of frame delimiter (SFD) are encountered in the network, to reduce the energy consumption caused by its
radio unit. When the packets are encrypted, the detection of packet segments (i.e. preamble and SFD) becomes
complicated. The activity jammers are equipped with an extra unit to overcome this diﬃculty by periodically
sensing the received signal strength indicator (RSSI) level. When a predeﬁned level of RSSI is detected, the
jammer initiates an attack by assuming the existence of an ongoing communication. Scan jammers search
through all existing channels periodically, and as long as any network traﬃc is detected, they initiate an attack
in the current channel. However, the pulse jammer remains on a single channel and sends out small packets
periodically to impede the ongoing communication [8].
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In this study, we designed QUJDA, which uses the anomaly method and operates in a distributed manner,
to detect J-DoS type of attacks. Each sensor node in our simulation environment was assumed to be installed
with QUJDA. QUJDA utilizes PDR, BPR, and ECA parameters to diﬀerentiate jamming conditions from
natural network conditions. Moreover, QUJDA uses a collective determination approach, which is based on
exchanging QUERY and REPLY packets between the neighbor nodes to improve detection performance.
The contributions of this paper are:
• Isolating jamming-style attacks from natural network conditions such as collision, hardware, and software
faults, while maintaining a high detection rate along with a low false positive rate;
• Wide-ranging and lightweight detection mechanism for various types of jamming attacks; and
• No additional hardware (GPS, DSP, etc.) requirement for detection mechanisms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related research studies on jamming
detection systems for WSNs. Section 3 describes the proposed query-based jamming detection algorithms for
wireless sensor networks. The performance evaluation of the proposed query-based jamming detection algorithm
is presented in Section 4. The paper is concluded by Section 5.

2.

Related works

Although many jammer models have been proposed in the literature, the detection methods for these jammer
models have not been studied suﬃciently. Xu et al. developed 2 distinct methods for the detection of 4
types of jammers that they had proposed earlier [4]. In the ﬁrst method, packet delivery ratios (PDR) and
RSSI dispersion ratios are used to distinguish the legitimate operations from the jammed ones. A range of
scenarios was applied to measure the PDR parameters associated with RSSI values. In doing so, appropriate
threshold signal levels were sampled so that 2 distinct regions in the network could be determined: benign and
jammed regions. Any node having lower PDR levels than PDR threshold levels and higher RSSI level than
RSSI threshold level suggests that an attack exists. The major disadvantage of this method is that the system
is tested by only 3 nodes: a transmitter, a receiver, and a jammer. The collision rates can be augmented due to
the high number of neighbor nodes; however, the RSSI parameter cannot be easily determined [9]. Thus, the
detection performance of this method can be considerably decreased, especially in large-scale and high-density
networks. In the second method proposed by Xu et al., PDR values and the location data of the nodes are
utilized for detection procedures. However, this method requires some additional global positioning system
(GPS) hardware or localization techniques.
Another detection mechanism for jamming attacks was suggested by Wood et al., in which the jammers
could be identiﬁed by the channel utilization rate compared with a speciﬁed threshold value [5]. However, the
channel utilization rate can also be decreased by failures originating from the hardware and software faults of
the surrounding neighbor nodes. The channel utilization rate, therefore, cannot be used alone to determine the
presence of an attack.
3

Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci, Vol.19, No.1, 2011

3.

The design of the proposed query-based jamming detection algorithm

In order to fulﬁll all responsibilities and maintain all functions for a WSN, jamming attacks should be detected
and an appropriate solution for each jammer should be provided accordingly. We designed QUJDA, in which
an anomaly-based distributed method is used to detect the jammers listed above, by taking into account those
requirements. In this section, the designed algorithm will be explained in detail.

3.1.

The detection parameters of jamming attacks

Jamming attacks can corrupt communication completely in the sensor networks or cause some abnormal
conditions to occur. Many quantitative network parameters, such as collision rate, RSSI, and bad frame
ratios, can reﬂect the stability of the network. Anomaly-based methods can make use of these parameters
to determine the state of the network. However, abnormal conditions can also originate from either adverse
scenarios or natural sources such as hardware faults, software bugs, heavy precipitation, and blizzards. For
instance, congestion in a sensor network might be caused by one of these natural sources. The jamming
detection procedures can be very complicated if smarter jammers are deployed in WSNs. For successful
detection, the diﬀerence between normal and abnormal conditions must be clariﬁed properly. Otherwise, false
positive occasions may turn the detection mechanisms into useless and redundant resources.
In our jamming detection system, we used some network parameters, such as PDR, bad packet ratio
(BPR), and energy consumption amount (ECA), obtained from the MAC layer to diﬀerentiate the network
conditions either caused by natural sources or jamming attacks.
3.1.1.

Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR)

The packet delivery ratio is deﬁned as the ratio of successfully delivered packets over the number of sent packets
[4]. A sender node conﬁrms the deliverance of a packet only upon receiving an ACK packet from a receiver node.
If 4-way handshaking (RTS/CTS/DATA/ACK) is used, the PDR can be found by comparing the RTS/DATA
packets sent with the CTS/ACK packets received.
We conducted a set of network simulations to investigate the eﬀect of PDR values over the performance
of the detection procedures by which normal and abnormal network conditions are separated from each other.
The sensor network under test was simulated throughout 36,000 s and the PDR parameter was measured with
a sampling rate of 30 s intervals in the OMNET++ [10] simulation environment, about which details will be
given in Table 3 in Section 4.
Each bar in Figure 1 indicates minimum, average, and maximum PDR values obtained from a single
node by a singular simulation with intervals of 30 s. PDR values obtained from all simulations, apart from
natural network conditions, can be combined roughly into 4 groups. As seen in Figure 1, constant, deceptive,
and control/listen interval jammers occupy the communication medium all of the time, and they impede the
sensor nodes from sending any packets. Similarly, reactive and interrupt jammers corrupt the packets as soon
as any transaction in the network is detected. As a result, the PDR values obtained during the attacking period
of these jammers are almost 0.
The second group includes a data packet and random jammers. The PDR values obtained while a random
or data packet jammer operates in the network primarily depend on the sleep/attack periods of the jammer. As
4
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the attacking time gets longer, PDR values monitored in the sensor nodes are subject to substantial decrease,
since these jammers can predict the timing of the packets precisely. However, the jamming performance depends
on the eﬀectiveness of the prediction mechanism in which CTS packets are detected.
No:Normal
ReJ:Reactive Jammer
LIJ:Listen Jammer
IntJ:Interrupt Jammer

Con:Congestion
RaJ:Random Jammer
CIJ:Control Jammer
ActJ:Activity Jammer

Los:Lossy Link
CoJ:Constant Jammer
DaJ:Data Jammer
PulJ:PulseJammer

NeiF:Neighboor Fault
DeJ:Deceptive Jammer
CluJ:ClusterJammer
ScJ:Scan Jammer

100
Packet Delivery Ratio (%)

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
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0
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Con Los NeiF ReJ RaJ CoJ

DeJ LIJ CIJ
Scenarios

DaJ CluJ IntJ ActJPulJ ScJ

Figure 1. The average PDR ratios sampled in a sensor node with diverse scenarios (sampling period: 30 s, simulation
length: 36,000 s, error bars indicate extreme values).

Cluster and pulse jammers, forming the third group, have PDR ratios between 15% and 30%. Although
a cluster jammer has a built-in prediction mechanism for data packet timings, some data packets can even be
omitted. Likewise, the periodic nature of the pulse jammer impedes a prevailing jamming attack. Therefore,
these jammers’ attack PDR values are not as low as expected.
Finally, activity and scan jammers are not as eﬃcient as the others are; PDR values are always above
50%, which means that the eﬃciency of the attack appears to be trivial for both jammers. Higher PDR values
can be explained by the fact that activity and scan jammers are not fast enough to sense all of the network
activities.
The PDR parameter is not only decreased by a jammer attack, but is also decreased signiﬁcantly by
imperfect connections, faults in the neighbor nodes, or network collisions. In fact, the PDR cannot be used
alone to discriminate natural network conditions from the symptoms of the attacks.
3.1.2.

Bad Packet Ratio (BPR)

As for the second parameter, BPR is deﬁned as the number of damaged packets received divided by the total
number of packets or preambles received for a sensor node. Sensor nodes determine the reliability of packets
by using the cyclic redundancy check (CRC) test and drop oﬀ the packets if the CRC test returns a negative
result.
We repeated the simulation (details and conﬁgurations are given in Section 4) for the BPR parameter for
36,000 s with a sampling rate of 30 s intervals. Each bar in Figure 2 indicates minimum, average, and maximum
BPR values obtained from a single node by a singular simulation with 30 s intervals. Since no valid preamble
or packet exists in the case of constant or listen/control interval jammer attacking scenarios along with faulty
5
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neighbor node scenarios, BPR values were obtained as almost 0. Having high BPR ratios in most attacking
scenarios facilitates the separating of the attacking and natural network conditions from each other. However,
in the event of low BPR ratios, separating the natural network conditions from the attacking conditions can be
particularly complicated.
No:Normal
ReJ:Reactive Jammer
LIJ:Listen Jammer
IntJ:Interrupt Jammer

Con:Congestion
RaJ:Random Jammer
CIJ:Control Jammer
ActJ:Activity Jammer

Los:Lossy Link
CoJ:Constant Jammer
DaJ:Data Jammer
PulJ:PulseJammer

NeiF:Neighboor Fault
DeJ:Deceptive Jammer
CluJ:ClusterJammer
ScJ:Scan Jammer

100

Bad Packet Ratioı (%)
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60
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30
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0

No Con Los NeiF ReJ RaJ CoJ DeJ LIJ
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CIJ DaJ CluJ IntJ ActJ

PulJ ScJ

Figure 2. The average BPR ratios sampled in a sensor node with diverse scenarios (sampling period: 30 s, simulation
length: 36,000 s).

PDR and BPR parameters demonstrate the quality of communication for the transmitter side and receiver
side, respectively. These 2 parameters are in inverse proportion in most cases; however, both the BPR and PDR
parameters can be low in some particular cases. For example in Figure 3, if node B and node C are assumed to be
under an attack from constant, deceptive, or listen/control interval jammers, these sensor nodes cannot perform
a healthy transaction because of persistent jamming signals. In such cases, the PDR ratios of the attack-free
sensors (node A, a boundary node) can be decreased while their neighbor nodes are under attack, since they are

Sink Node

C
B
A

Jammer

Boundary
Node
Boundary
Nodes

Figure 3. A jamming model.
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not able to receive ACK packets from their neighbors. However, the BPR ratios of such nodes remain at a very
low level, as they are not subject to direct attacks. In such scenarios, even though the node is aﬀected by the
attack, both PDR and BPR levels can remain at low levels. This occurrence is contradictory to the common
relationship between PDR and BPR parameters and, consequently, the jamming detection procedures can be
intricate.
3.1.3.

Energy Consumption Amount (ECA)

ECA is deﬁned as the approximate amount of energy consumed in a period of time by a sensor node. The ECA
parameter can be calculated by the help of the periods of working modes of the MICA2 nodes. The radio unit
of a MICA2 node consumes 16.5 mA, 9.6 mA, and 1 μA in transmit, receive, and sleep modes, respectively [11].
This means that with a 3 V battery, the radio unit of the MICA2 node dissipates 49.5 mW, 28.86 mW, and 3
μW of power per hour in the transmit, receive, and sleep modes, respectively. The estimated power dissipation
of a MICA2 node can then be calculated for a speciﬁed time by using the operating periods of radio unit and
the power dissipation rates given above.

Energy Consumption Amount (μW)

No:Normal
ReJ:Reactive Jammer
LIJ:Listen Jammer
IntJ:Interrupt Jammer

480
440
400
360
320
280
240
200
160
120
80
40
0
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RaJ:Random Jammer
CIJ:Control Jammer
ActJ:Activity Jammer

Los:Lossy Link
CoJ:Constant Jammer
DaJ:Data Jammer
PulJ:PulseJammer

NeiF:Neighboor Fault
DeJ:Deceptive Jammer
CluJ:ClusterJammer
ScJ:Scan Jammer

No Con Los NeiF ReJ RaJ CoJ DeJ LIJ CIJ DaJ CluJ IntJ ActJPulJ ScJ
Scenarios

Figure 4. The average ECA ratios sampled in a sensor node with diverse attacking scenarios, along with natural network
conditions (sampling period: 60 s, simulation length: 36,000 s).

We repeated the simulation (details and conﬁgurations are given in Section 4) for the ECA parameter for
36,000 s with a sampling rate of 30 s intervals. Each bar in Figure 4 indicates minimum, average, and maximum
ECA values obtained from a single node by a singular simulation with 30 s intervals. ECA values obtained
from congestion, lossy links, or faulty neighbor nodes, along with some attacking scenarios, can be lower than
the ECA values that are obtained from normal scenarios. This situation is caused by the fact that in normal
scenarios, sensor nodes transmit and receive more packets compared to natural network conditions. In addition,
in deceptive, constant, random, and listen/control interval jammer attacks, the ECA parameter of the sensor
nodes is very high compared to natural network conditions. While deceptive jammers force the nodes to remain
continuously in receive mode, constant and listen/control interval jammers force the sensor nodes to remain in
listen mode, and therefore, ECA values obtained from the simulation can be veriﬁed in this manner.
7
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Constant and listen/control interval jammers keep nodes in BACKOFF mode since the communication
medium is always busy. The nodes continue to remain in listen mode, even though they are released from the
BACKOFF period in the sleep mode. Therefore, nodes in the BACKOFF period cannot be shifted into a sleep
period, and this constraint cause the nodes to deplete their batteries earlier. Since there is no IDLE mode in
the CC1000 radio unit, the nodes dissipate equivalent power under attack from constant, listen/control interval,
and deceptive jammers. The nodes under attack from random, constant, deceptive, and listen/control interval
jammers consume more power than normal network scenarios and this outcome can be used to distinguish the
normal and jamming scenarios from each other.

3.2.

The method of anomaly detection

We selected PDR, BPR, and ECA as system parameters that are directly aﬀected by jamming attacks to
determine anomalies in the network. Each node with a QUJDA unit utilizes the system parameters to compare
initial network conditions with the current network conditions. The nodes measure and analyze the system
parameters during the initialization period and, subsequently, the threshold values, which are used to separate
normal network conditions from abnormal ones with the help of some statistical operations and dispersions, are
determined.
The ﬂowchart of the determination of threshold values that were used for anomaly identiﬁcation is
illustrated in Figure 5. The critical threshold values that allow the separation of normal and abnormal network
conditions were obtained from procedures in which software techniques such as system parameters dispersion
and data mining were utilized. In the determination of inﬁltration systems, mainly statistical techniques,
artiﬁcial neural networks, hidden Markov models, support vector machines, neuro-fuzzy operations, and genetic
algorithms are deployed in the literature [12, 13]. However, statistical techniques are widely preferred because
they induce an insigniﬁcant process burden into procedures. Therefore, statistical methods can be considered
one of the appropriate solutions for sensor nodes that have limited computing and energy resources.

Start

Measure PDR, BPR, and ECA
Parameters and record the dispersion
(Periodically)

Initialization period
over?

N

Y
Determine threshold values using
PDR, BPR, and ECA dispersion
Stop

Figure 5. Obtaining threshold values for anomaly determination.
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The QUJDA system that we designed employs the 6-sigma (6 σ) statistical method to determine normal/abnormal network conditions. This method was originated by MotorolaTM in 1987. It is implemented
with the goal of describing a high level of quality, which a company tends to achieve. This method includes a
simple yet eﬀective approach in which a low control limit (LCL) and high control limit (HCL) can be calculated
with the help of the average and standard deviation of the distribution of the system parameters. In equations
(1) and (2), while μ represents the average values of N numbers of data, σ stands for standard deviation. In
a normal distribution, 99.99966% of the data is within the HCL and LCL. A value outside of the HCL and
LCL can be accepted as abnormal, as seen in Figure 6. Each node deployed with QUJDA investigates the
distribution of the PDR, BPR, and ECA parameters and tries to detect abnormal conditions. The jamming
detection algorithm we proposed uses the 6-sigma methods for this purpose.
LCL = μ + 6σ

(1)

HCL = μ − 6σ

(2)

f(x)

Abnormal

Abnormal

(LCL)

(HCL)

x

Figure 6. Determination of threshold values of the system parameters.

The LCL is calculated to ﬁnd the PDR threshold value and the HCL is used to ﬁnd the BPR and ECA
threshold values. Since lower PDR levels can normally suggest an anomaly condition in the network, the LCL
is used for the PDR threshold calculations. On the other hand, higher BPR and ECA levels can normally
suggest an anomaly; therefore, the BPR and ECA threshold values are calculated by means of the HCL. Having
performed these calculations, thresholds values belonging to the system parameters (PDR th , BPR th , and
ECA th ) can be determined. According to the obtained results, having determined the threshold values, the
6-sigma method has produced optimum results. However, simulations in which lower sigma numbers (5-sigma,
4-sigma, etc.) are used result in increased detection rates along with greatly increased false positive rates. On
the other hand, using higher sigma numbers (7-sigma, 8-sigma, etc.) decreases both detection and false positive
rates together. As a result, we preferred the 6-sigma method in the determination process of threshold values
through all simulations.

3.3.

A Query-based jamming detection algorithm

QUJDA is an anomaly-based and distributed algorithm by which jamming attacks can be detected by means
of a set of network parameters, namely, PDR, BPR, and ECA. QUJDA, which is deployed in each node in the
9
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network, monitors the PDR, BPR, and ECA parameters in a speciﬁed period and records the threshold levels
of each parameter by the 6-sigma method when no attack is present. Having completed the initialization stage,
each node continues monitoring its parameters periodically to observe any anomaly by comparing the initial
and current levels of the parameters.
Each node runs the QUJDA algorithm independently to detect network anomalies. However, this
mechanism cannot be fulﬁlled by only the threshold mechanism when a high performance result is needed.
For instance, a node that is located outside of the coverage area of the jammer, like node A in Figure 3, can be
disturbed indirectly by the jammers through its neighbors, and that is called a boundary node. In the boundary
nodes, while the PDR is measured as low, the ECA and BPR ratios can remain at normal levels. This condition
can occur for the nodes that have a faulty neighbor node. In order to minimize these drawbacks, QUJDA uses
a collective determination approach, which is based on exchanging QUERY and REPLY (QR) packets between
the neighbor nodes that have assumed themselves to be under attack according to the correlation of the PDR,
BPR, and ECA parameters.
QUJDA samples the PDR, BPR, and ECA parameters periodically and compares them with the threshold
values that are obtained during the initialization period of the network. If an abnormal condition is encountered
in the comparison procedures, the node initiates the QUERY procedure immediately to discover the origin of
the anomaly. Having sent a QUERY packet in a predeﬁned time, the node waits for a reply packet from its
neighbors. The REPLY packets received are used to observe the state of the neighbor nodes. In some scenarios,
however, intricate conditions can occur throughout the QR packets’ transaction procedures. For instance, the
constant and deceptive jammers can even block the QR packets since they occupy the channel all the time. While
reactive jammers corrupt the QUERY packets, data packet jammers cannot attack QR packets. Therefore, to
separate the jamming and bad network conditions from each other and to facilitate the detection procedures,
we designed a special frame for the QR packets, as shown in Figure 7.
2 bytes

2 bytes

2 bytes

Node_ID

Target_ID

Packet_ID

N/A

1 byte
Flags

.....

N/A

Forced

Alarm

Figure 7. The frame structure of QUERY and REPLY packets.

As seen in Figure 7, the QR packets consist of 7 bytes. While QUERY packets are sent by broadcast
to the medium, the REPLY packets are sent by unicast. The ALARM ﬂag in the QR packets indicates an
anomaly and it is set if the anomaly is positive. A sensor node suspecting itself under a jammer attack will
set the ALARM ﬂag in the QUERY packet and wait for the REPLY packets from its neighbors in response.
The neighbors that received QUERY packets check their PDR, BPR, and ECA values, and if an anomaly is
detected, the ALARM ﬂag in the REPLY packet is set. Additionally, the nodes can be informed by their onehop neighbors with the help of ALARM ﬂags in the REPLY packets. This mechanism facilitates the detection
of the jammers attacking the data packets in particular. Since these types of jammers attack only large-sized
data packets, they can neither block nor corrupt the QR packets.
The FORCED ﬂag in the QUERY packets indicates that a sensor node has sent out a forced QUERY
packet. If the node is not able to send a QUERY packet in a particular time, it assumes that the channel
is occupied by a jammer. In this case, the node sends out a QUERY packet by setting the FORCED ﬂag in
10
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the QUERY packet. Because the channel is busy all the time, the node sends out the packet by disregarding
the contention rules and increasing the transmitter power level. Thus, the probability of the boundary nodes
receiving QUERY packets can be augmented and jamming detection procedures can be further facilitated.
QUJDA works as follows:
1. The node detecting an abnormal condition in the network tries to send a QUERY packet in 2 sampling
periods by following node contention rules. By setting the ALARM ﬂag in the QUERY packet, the node
indicates that there is a high risk of an attack and the condition will be resolved by further transactions
between its neighbors.
(a) If the node sends the QUERY packet in the allocated time, it waits for the REPLY packets sent by
neighbor nodes.
(b) If the node is not able to send a QUERY packet in the allocated time, it assumes a jamming attack
is in progress, caused by constant, deceptive, or listen/control interval jammers.
2. If the node resolves that an attack is present, in order to complete the jamming detection procedures
in a secure manner, the node tries to send FORCED QUERY packets 3 times with random intervals by
disregarding the contention rules. In this procedure, the node uses a higher rate of power for transmitting
FORCED QUERY packets. Thus, the possibility of the boundary nodes receiving the FORCED QUERY
packets and the accuracy of both detection rates and faulty conditions can be improved.
3. The nodes receiving QUERY packets check their PDR, BPR, and ECA parameters and send back the
REPLY packets by either setting or resetting the ALARM ﬂag in the REPLY packets. If PDR n < PDR th
and ECA n > ECA th , or PDR n < PDR th and BPR n > BPR th conditions are true, the ALARM ﬂag
is set or reset if the conditions are false. Setting the ALARM ﬂag in the REPLY packet means that the
node is under abnormal conditions.
4. The node evaluates the REPLY packets once the REPLY timer is over and determines a jammer attack
is present if the following conditions are true:
(a) No REPLY packet is received.
(b) The number of REPLY packets received is lower than the number of neighbors and no REPLY packet
is received from the neighbors on the way of the sink node.
(c) The number of REPLY packets received is lower than or equal to the number of neighbors and the
ALARM ﬂag in the REPLY packet, received from the neighbors on the way of sink node, is set.
The notations used in QUJDA are given in Table 1 as a list, and in Table 2, the pseudocode of QUJDA not
only incorporates basic network parameters (variables), but also deploys QR message procedures (functions).
11
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Table 1. The notation used in QUJDA.

Notation
SendingQuery
QuerySent
QueryRcvd
ForcedQuerySent
ForcedQueryRcvd
QueryTimerOver
ReplyTimerOver
NumOfForcedQuery
SetQueryTimerFunc()
SetReplyTimerFunc()
StopQueryTimerFunc()
SendQueryFunc()
SendForcedQueryFunc()
AnalyzeReplyPacketsFunc()

Meaning
A Boolean variable to indicate the state of a query being sent
A Boolean variable to indicate the state of a query packet sent
A Boolean variable to indicate the state of a query packet received
A Boolean variable to indicate the state of a forced query packet sent
A Boolean variable to indicate the state of a forced query packet received
A Boolean variable to indicate the state of the query timer
A Boolean variable to indicate the state of the reply timer
An integer variable to indicate the number of forced query packets sent
A function to set the query timer
A function to set the reply timer
A function to stop the query timer
A function incorporating the query procedures
A function incorporating the forced query procedures
A function to analyze the reply packets

Table 2. Query-based jamming detection algorithm.

//Called each sampling period
QueryBasedJammingDetectionAlgo(){
if ((PDRn < PDRth and ECAn > ECAth ) or (PDRn < PDRth and BPRn > BPRth )) //Anomaly
if (SendingQuery = False)
SendQueryFunc()
SetQueryTimerFunc(Now+2*SamplingPeriod)
SendingQuery = True
else if (QueryTimerOver = False and QuerySent = True)
StopQueryTimerFunc()
SetReplyTimerFunc(Now+2*SamplingPeriod )
else if (QueryTimerOver = True and QuerySent = False)
Jammed = True
If (NumOfForcedQuery<3)
SendForcedQueryFunc(Now+RandomDelay)
ForcedQuerySent = True
NumOfForcedQuery++
end if
else if (ReplyTimerOver = True)
AnalyzeReplyPacketsFunc();
end if
// Conditions used to determine attack in the boundary nodes
else if (PDRn < PDRth and BPRn < BPRth and ECAn < ECAth and ForcedQueryRcvd=True)
Jammed = True;
else if (PDRn < PDRth and BPRn < BPRth and ECAn < ECAth )
Fault = True;
else
Jammed = False;
end if
}
12
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4.

The performance analysis of the jamming detection algorithm
proposed

The performance analysis of QUJDA was implemented in an OMNET++ [10] simulation environment by using
3 criteria: detection rates, false positive rates, and communication overhead. Detection rates indicate the
proportion of how often the system successfully detects the attacks from the start to the end. The false positive
rate indicates the proportion of events in which an attack is detected when no real attack exists. Communication
overhead originates from the detection system, which imposes extra communication procedures on the network.
Our implementation settings are listed in Table 3. The modeled wireless environment incorporated 100
normal nodes scattered randomly by the help of equation (3) [6, 7], which was used to determine the node
density (D) in an -length squared ﬁeld with a distance of r between each node. A single sink node was located
in the center of the target ﬁeld.

N.π
D=
r
(3)

To determine the eﬀect of the number of jammers on the performance of QUJDA, a varied number of jammers
were located in the network and each jammer model was examined independently. We utilized the jammed
node ratio (JNR) to locate the jammers in the network. The JNR is deﬁned as the percentage of the jammed
nodes to total nodes in the network. The JNR parameter can be conﬁgured as 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%, and
to maintain these ratios, varied numbers of jammers were located in the network. The simulation environment
included 100 normal sensor nodes, only 1 sink node, and a varied number of jammers, depending on JNR values.
Table 3. Simulation environment settings.

Notation
Number of Nodes (N)
Node Density (D)
Transmision Range (r)
Jammed Node Ratios
Fault Node Ratio
MAC Protocol
Sensor Node Type
WSN Type
Traﬃcs
Simulation Length
Sampling Interval

Meaning or Quantity
100
10, 15, 20, 25
100 m
25%, 50%, 75%, 100%
25%
S-MAC (100 msn/900 msn)
MICA2
Proactive
1 packet/5 s and 2 packets/1 s
36,000 s
30 s

The power rate, capacity, and radio communication distance of normal and jammer nodes were arranged
in compliance with MICA2 [14] devices. The S-MAC protocol [15] was selected as the MAC standard, and listen
and sleep periods were determined as 100 ms and 900 ms (10% duty cycle), respectively. In all simulation runs,
WSNs were assumed in a proactive conﬁguration and the packet generation was arranged as 1 packet/5 s for
light traﬃc and 2 packets/1 s for heavy traﬃc.
To analyze faulty node conditions in the network, a randomly selected 25% of the sensor nodes were
forced to artiﬁcially generate faults in a random scheduling manner. A 2-event discreet Markov chain, called
the Gilbert-Elliot model, was used to model the loss of a communication channel [16]. In each simulation run,
13
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PDR, BPR, and ECA parameters were sampled with a constant period of 30 s. The sampling period was
optimized long enough so that any attack that occurred could not be missed. However, while short sampling
periods can sometimes increase false positive rates, especially for networks with light traﬃc loads, long sampling
periods can decrease false positive rates with an increase in the duration of the attack detection period.
A random network topology was created for each simulation run and threshold levels of each network
parameter were sampled from the normal network behaviors during a period of 36,000 s. Having obtained the
threshold values, the simulation was run for an additional 36,000 s to examine various jammer scenarios. The
simulations were repeated 5 times with varied topologies and the average values obtained from the results were
recorded.

4.1.

Detection rates

The detection rates of QUJDA in various network conditions are represented in Figures 8-10. The ﬁrst crucial
point in the Figures is that although the detection rates appear to be very high, they have not reached the
level of 100%. The reason lies with the jamming detection procedure, which cannot be executed through 4
sampling periods at maximum in query cycles. The second important point is that as the percentage of the
jammed nodes increases, the detection rates increase, as well. This originates from the decline of the number
of boundary nodes and the network parameters, which is overly aﬀected by the jamming attacks.
Another conclusion we reached is that higher detection rates can be achieved in bad connections (lossy

99.45

99.4

99.35

99.2
99

Detection Rate (%)

Detection Rate (%)

links and congested or faulty nodes) compared to normal conditions. In such cases, the corruption rate of the
QR packets is also increased. The detection rates of scan and pulse jammers are not as high as the rest. Both
jammers can be accepted as harmless, since their damage to a network is rather trivial. Since these jammers
are not as successful as the others, normally a lower detection rate is expected.

99.25
99.15
99.05
98.95
98.85
98.75
25

Reactive (Bad Conditions)
Reactive
Random (Bad Conditions)
Random
Constant (Bad Conditions)
Constant
Deceptive (Bad Conditions)
Deceptive

50
75
Jammed Node Ratio (%)

100

Figure 8. Detection rates for reactive, random, constant,
and deceptive jammers in various conditions.

4.2.

98.8
98.6
98.4
98.2
98
97.8
97.6
25

Listen Interval (Bad Conditions)
Listen Interval
Control Interval (Bad Conditions)
Control Interval
Data Packet (Bad Conditions)
Data Packet
Cluster (Bad Conditions)
Cluster

50
75
Jammed Node Ratio (%)

100

Figure 9. Detection rates for listen and control interval,
data packet, and cluster jammers in various conditions.

False positive rates

The obtained false positive rates of each jammer are shown in Figures 11-13. The ﬁrst remarkable fact is that
higher false positive rates were achieved in bad network conditions with respect to normal conditions. This
situation was caused by both the drop of the PDR and the rise of the BPR because of a lossy link. In addition,
14

ÇAKIROĞLU, ÖZCERİT: Design and evaluation of a query-based jamming detection...,

faulty nodes in the network are another factor in the increase of the false positive rates. A further important
outcome is that as the number of nodes under attack increases, the false positive rate decreases. The last
conclusion from the Figures is that as the number of nodes directly aﬀected by the jammers increases, the
number of nodes detecting false positives decreases.
When the JNR is 0, there is no jammer in the network. Therefore, when the JNR is 0, there are 2 cases
for the FPR level in Figures 11-13. Under normal network conditions in each jamming scenarios, all FPR values
are equal to almost 1%. On the other hand, under bad network conditions, the FPR values are below 0.1%.
100
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False PositiveRate (%)
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Figure 12. False positive rates for listen and control interval, data packet, and cluster jammers in diverse scenarios.

4.3.
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Figure 11. False positive rates for reactive, random,
constant, and deceptive jammers in diverse scenarios.
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Figure 10. Detection rates for interrupt, activity, scan,
and pulse jammers in various conditions.
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Figure 13. False positive rates for interrupt, activity,
scan, and pulse jammers in diverse scenarios.

Communication overhead

Since QUJDA uses additional QR packets for jamming detection, it is obvious that communication overheads
are unavoidable. The amount of the overhead is closely related to the number of neighbors (node density in
the network), the type of jammers, the JNR, and natural network conditions. Therefore, we conducted a set
of simulations to analyze the eﬀect of the communication overheads in the target network with diverse node
densities and JNRs.
In Figure 14, average communication overheads originating from normal and bad network conditions are
15
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presented when the JNR is 0. As seen in Figure 14, as the node density of the network increases, the number
of neighbors per sensor node gets larger; therefore, the total overhead develops as expected. Since the PDR
and BPR parameters are aﬀected negatively by bad network conditions, naturally more QR packets are needed
for jamming detection procedures. According to the results obtained from the simulation environment, the
communication overhead of the system designed can reach up to almost 7.5% for each sensor node when no
attack is assumed.
In Figures 15 and 16, communication overhead against node density in normal network conditions with a
50% JNR is illustrated for all jammers under examination. Figures 15 and 16 incorporate the simulation results
for reactive, random, constant, deceptive, listen, and control jammers; and the data packet, cluster, interrupt,
activity, scan, and pulse jammers, respectively. As seen clearly from both Figures, the communication overhead
is almost directly proportional to node density (D).
20
Normal Network Conditions
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16
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6
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2

16
14
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20
Node Density (D)
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Figure 14. Communication overhead against network
density in diverse network conditions.
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Figure 15. Communication overhead against network
density in normal network conditions with a 50% JNR for
reactive, random, constant, deceptive, listen, and control
jammers.

In the second simulation run, communication overhead against network density in bad network conditions
with a 50% JNR was obtained; the outcomes are presented in Figures 17 and 18. In this phase, the communication overhead, which demonstrated similar outcomes to Figures 15 and 16, reached 13% at maximum.
In Figures 19 and 20, communication overhead against node density in normal network conditions with
a 100% JNR is illustrated for all jammers under examination. Figures 19 and 20 incorporate the simulation
results for reactive, random, constant, deceptive, data packet, and cluster jammers; and for interrupt, activity,
scan, pulse, listen, and control jammers, respectively. In Figures 21 and 22, communication overhead against
node density in bad network conditions with a 100% JNR is illustrated for all jammers under examination.
Note that communication overhead for constant, deceptive, and control/listen interval jammers is 0 in
Figures 19-22 because the channel was busy at all times due to constant jamming attacks; even sending Q/R
packets to the medium was virtually impossible. Therefore, the average ratio of sending and receiving packets
was 0 and the communication overhead became 0.
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Figure 19. Communication overhead against network
density with a 100% JNR for reactive, random, constant,
deceptive, data packet, and cluster jammers in normal
network conditions.
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Figure 18. Communication overhead against network
density in bad network conditions with a 50% JNR for
data, cluster, interrupt, activity, scan, and pulse jammers.
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Figure 17. Communication overheads against network
density in bad network conditions with a 50% JNR for
reactive, random, constant, deceptive, listen, and control
jammers.
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Figure 16. Communication overhead against network
density in normal network conditions with a 50% JNR for
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Figure 20. Communication overhead against network
density with a 100% JNR for interrupt, activate, scan,
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Figure 21. Communication overhead against network
density with a 100% JNR for reactive, random, constant,
deceptive, data packet, and cluster jammers in bad network conditions.
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Figure 22. Communication overhead against network density with a 100% JNR for interrupt, activate, scan, pulse,
listen interval, and control interval jammers in bad network conditions.

Another crucial observation is that an insigniﬁcant decrease in communication overhead occurs when the
JNR ratio is raised from 50% to 100%. This is mainly caused by intensive jamming attacks that aﬀect more
sensor nodes in the network. An increase in the ratio of corrupted QR packets because of intensive jamming
attacks will also minimize the number of received and sent packets. The communication overhead imposed onto
the network when all sensor nodes are subject to jamming attacks will be 12% at maximum.

5.

Conclusion

Jamming attacks are major threats for sensor nodes, which are mostly located in harsh environments and
have limited energy and resources. To overcome such adversary actions and take appropriate countermeasures
instantly, the detection of jamming attack is necessary. In this paper, we have proposed an anomaly- and
query-based detection algorithm to be used against jamming attacks deﬁned in the recent literature. According
to simulation results, the system designed can diﬀerentiate all hazardous jamming attacks from natural network
conditions with 97% or higher detection rates along with 0.95% or lower false positive rates. Another advantage
is that the algorithm, which can be used for modern sensor nodes, does not require additional hardware units
(GPS, DSP, etc.). However, communication overhead originating from the designed algorithm cannot be avoided
in any scenario and its maximum value was obtained as 13%. The feasibility of QUJDA should be tested by
using a real WSN; in this way, the simulation results and physical implementation example could be compared
with each other.
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